Strategic Insights: Would a Post-2011 Residual U.S. Force in Iraq Have Changed Anything?

English: Major ethno-religious groups in Iraq ...

English: Major ethno-religious groups in Iraq Shiite Arabs Sunni Arabs Kurds Assyrians Yazidis Turkmen (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

February 9, 2015 | Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Currently, U.S. policy analysts and governmental leaders are examining the rise of the Islamic State (IS) organization, particularly its seizure of vast expanses of Iraqi territory in the summer of 2014. People legitimately ask what could have been done and would a residual U.S. force in Iraq have prevented the spread of IS from Syria to Iraq or at least its seizure of northern Iraq? Opponents of the decision to withdraw all U.S. forces often contend that a U.S. residual force could have prevented or mitigated the IS offensive in northern Iraq. Supporters of the decision to withdraw usually point out that the Iraqi government would not agree to a Status of Forces agreement (SOFA) that allowed U.S. forces to remain in that country without being subordinate to Iraqi domestic law. The second argument seems to accept the views of the critics, while suggesting that the withdrawal was required as part of an effort to respect Iraqi sovereignty. Both sides seem to agree that a residual force in Iraq was a good idea. They disagree on why it did not occur. Continue reading

Iraq crisis: ISIS militants push towards Baghdad -June 13 as it happened

Group claims mass killings of Iraqi troops, as militants battle security forces 50 miles from Baghdad – follow latest developments – follow latest developments

A man is executed in a video released by ISIS

A man is executed in a new video released by ISIS

Quote The Iraqi official confirmed numerous eyewitness reports that the militants flew a captured helicopter

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Interesting if true. It is not a one nutter show according to Mosul governor. Although he is perhaps not in the best position to speak freely.

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Quite wonkish but very revealing analysis of how Iranian proxies such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas have relocated from Syria to fight ISIS in Iraq.

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A new New York Times article paints a picture of the Iraqi government in crisis, appealing for the US for help, threatening Iran will fill the gap if they refuse.

Quote “If you’re in an antique shop there’s a sign, ‘If you broke it, you bought it,’  ” the official, who is an adviser to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, said. “I am not saying the Americans are responsible for everything, but they did not leave a well-trained army and they left us without any real air support, and the Obama administration really shares much of the blame.” Continue reading

Iran FM says US buildup near Iraq lacks ‘prudence’

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AP – Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, left, and his Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari during a joint …

By LARA JAKES, Associated Press – Mon Oct 31, 9:47 am ET

BAGHDAD – Iran‘s top diplomat on Monday bitingly questioned reported U.S. plans to build up American military forces across Mideast countries after withdrawing from Iraq, calling on Washington to be “more prudent and wise” or risk more unrest in the region.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi also dismissed American concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq after U.S. troops pull out at the end of December.

Those worries were a main motivation of failed U.S. efforts to leave at least several thousand American troops in Iraq beyond the Dec. 31 withdrawal deadline.

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Iraqi Rivalries Spell End for U.S. Troops

October 22, 2011

Author: Ned Parker, Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow

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Ned Parker, Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow

President Barack Obama’s announcement Friday that the remaining thirty-nine thousand troops will leave Iraq at the end of the year was largely the result of Iraq’s internal politics and a failure of U.S. policy to mend the rifts among the country’s political players.

If the U.S. military were to keep three thousand to five thousand military “trainers” as planned, Iraq’s parliament would have had to grant the force immunity. Obama finally realized this was not going to happen, due to the country’s tense realities resulting from the March 2010 national election.

The 2010 election ended in a near draw between Nouri al-Maliki and chief rival Ayad Allawi‘s Iraqiya bloc. A political stalemate was broken through a U.S.-backed deal in which Maliki was to remain prime minister and the defense minister was to have been chosen from the Iraqiya bloc. In turn, Allawi was to have headed a new national security council body.

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