Research and Papers

Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism

Muslim-Western Tensions Persist
FULL REPORT: Download

http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Western-Relations-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-July-21-2011.pdf

Table of Contents

Report After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

Report Summary

This report is a rapid response evaluation of the implications of the March 11, 2011 earthquake and consequent tsunami off the northeast coast of Japan. It focuses on Japan’s electricity system, its energy security, and the future of the nuclear power plants located in the earthquake- and tsunami-affected regions.

It will be updated in the near future as the situation concerning the Fukushima I and II nuclear power plants become clearer, for better or worse, and as more information becomes available about other consequences of the earthquake, the tsunami, the nuclear crisis, and their interactions.

………………………

www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reports/SRJapanReactors.pdf


Strategy and Airpower – Air and Space Power Journal – Spring 2011

Strategy and Airpower. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired. When a new technology appears in business or war, advantages in cost 

Read more:

www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2011/…/2011_1_04_warden.pdf

The evolution of AlQaedaismIdeologyterrorists, and appeal. Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer. December 2007. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS E Bakker – 2007
www.clingendael.nl/…/2007/20071200_cscp_csp_bakker_boer.pdf

Offensive Jihad’ in Sayyid Qutb’s Ideology

Friday, 25 March 2011 10:14

The term ‘jihad’ has become a buzzword in academic articles, news reports, movies, and even music. Any attack, in any country, by radical Islamists has caused the word to be put into play – whether correctly or incorrectly. What is perhaps more disturbing is the lack of understanding of this critical and oft-used term. As a result of the popular usage of this locution, much of the general public has come to believe that jihad is solely related to violence. Rather, jihad, historically speaking, has two critical meanings, of which violence plays a secondary and purely defensive role. What the world is witnessing today is a third type of jihad, known as ‘offensive jihad’, which is a fairly recent phenomenon and which can be tied solely to radical Islamists. This article is concerned with the third type of jihad and its founder, former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb.

More…

http://www.terorismul.ro/component/content/article/860-offensive-jihad-in-sayyid-qutbs-ideology-?format=pdf

A North Korean Diplomatic Directory

January 31st, 2011 by Steven Aftergood

The DNI Open Source Center has produced an updated directory of North Korean diplomatic missions (pdf) in Europe and Central Asia.

“The directory includes photos, when available, of overseas diplomatic personnel as well as such standard information as facility addresses, phone and fax numbers, and e-mail addresses. Personnel changes and new ambassadorial appointments also have been noted when relevant.”

A copy was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “North Korea– 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Europe and Central Asia,” Open Source Center, December 29, 2010.

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/01/dprk_diplo.html

North Korea — 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Europe and Central Asia

This report updates portions of the 2008 OSC North Korean Overseas Diplomatic Directory1

and introduces a few modifications and stylistic enhancements to facilitate its use. This

directory is fourth in a series of reports that cover DPRK diplomatic missions by geographic

region.a The directory includes photos, when available, of overseas diplomatic personnel as

well as such standard information as facility addresses, phone and fax numbers, and e-mail

addresses. Personnel changes and new ambassadorial appointments also have been noted

when relevant.

http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/dprk-diplo.pdf

OSC Media Aid: Overview of Leading Indian Social Media

The Indian social media scene represents a fast-emerging and influential domain of

information exchange involving nearly 60% of the 83 million Internet users in the country.

While Facebook and Orkut continue to dominate the social media scene, Twitter and some

other Indian microblogging websites are also becoming very popular. The rising significance

of social media in India is demonstrated by the fact that almost all the conventional media

have registered their presence on the social networking websites.

http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/india-social.pdf

 Wall Poster: Major Iranian Newspapers

February 2nd, 2011 by Steven Aftergood

Key characteristics of seventeen leading Iranian newspapers are described in a wall poster (large pdf) prepared last year by the DNI Open Source Center.

With an estimated circulation of 350,000-450,000, “Hamshahri appears to be the most widely read newspaper in Iran thanks to its voluminous classified advertisement supplement, attracting individuals seeking to buy a car, house or major goods and services. Others buy it for its football pages.”

A copy of the poster was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Ownership, Affiliation, and Influence of Major Iranian Newspapers,” Open Source Center, March 2010.

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/02/iran_newspapers.html

OWNERSHIP, AFFILIATION, AND INFLUENCE OF MAJOR IRANIAN NEWSPAPERS

http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/iran-media.pdf

The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions

by S Olson – 2011
The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions. Prepared for: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Prepared by: Stephen Olson
www.uscc.gov/…/TheEvolvingRoleofChinainInternationalInstitutions.pdf

Building a World Class system for aviation security

A Better WAy: Building A World ClAss system for AviAtion seCurity. 1 each day in the United States, roughly two million air travelers are advised to arrive
www.deplacementspros.com/attachment/261163/

Global Shipping Game: Game Report

by RI Newport – 2011
28 Jan 2011 Global Shipping Game Report. 3. Table of Contents …… game report (“Knowledge Management Structure for Global Shipping Game”).
Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………………… 4

I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………… 9

a. Statement of Sponsor’s Interest in this Topic……………………………………9

b. Objectives/Rationale for this Game………………………………………………9

c. Overarching Research Question……………………………………………..…10

d. Subsidiary Questions……………………………………………………………10

e. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables………………………10

f. Definition of Key Terms ………………………………………………………..11

II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY………………………………..12

a. Discussion of Game Design……………………………………………………12

b. Game Mechanics……………………………………………………………….12

c. Analytic Framing……………………………………………………………….14

d. Collection Approach……………………………………………………………16

III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS………………………………………………………………20

a. Player Demographics…………………………………………………………..20

b. Analysis of Game Moves………………………………………………………22

c. Limitations of Game Design and Analysis…………………….………………33

IV. IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………..35

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………..38

APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA………………………………………….39

www.usnwc.edu/…/War…/GameReports/GSG-Report_28Jan11_final.pdf

RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, XENOPHOBIA, IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

■■ANALYSIS

From an Existential Threat to a Security Risk and a Conceptual Impasse: Terrorism in Russia 2

By Aglaya Snetkov, Zurich

■■OPINION POLL

Russian Attitudes on Terrorism 5

■■ANALYSIS

Events in Moscow 11th December 2010: Political Crisis 7

By Emil Pain, Moscow

■■OPINION POLL

Nationalism in Contemporary Russia 10

■■ANALYSIS

Recent Developments in Inter-Ethnic Relations in Stavropol’skii krai 12

By Andrew Foxall, Oxford

■■INTERVIEW

The Role of the Media in Russia’s Inter-ethnic Relations: An Interview with Chelyabinsk Worker Editor Boris Kurshin 15

By Galima Galiullina, Chelyabinsk

German Association for

East European Studies

Research Centrefor East European StudiesUniversity of Bremen

Institute of History

University of Basel

Center forSecurity StudiesETH Zurich

Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies

The George Washington University

www.css.ethz.ch/box_feeder/Russian_Analytical_Digest_93.pdf

ConferenCe report – Security & Defence Agenda

30 Nov 2010 and address the future challenges to European security and how best to meet them. …. Security and Defence Day. Going global: Europe‘s security policy challenge …. 10. Conference Report Security and defence day 2010
www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/14/…/Conference_Report_Final.pdf

SecDef’10 – Going global: Europe’s security policy challenge

16 Feb 2011 SecDef’10Going global: Europe‘s security policy challenge
Contents

Foreword ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

Programme………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6

Institutional challenges for the EU ’s growing political power…………………………………………….14

Securing long-term resources………………………………………………………………………………………..21

Dissuasion and non-proliferation…………………………………………………………………………………26

Solidarity and the management of migration flows………………………………………………………..30

Can the EU become a global emergency response team?……………………………………………….34

Aerial defence systems: Giving Europe a strategic autonomy ……………………………………38

The EU as a maritime power………………………………………………………………………………………43

Speaker biographies …………………………………………………………………………………………………92

List of participants………………………………………………………………………………………………….108

www.securitydefenceagenda.org/…/SecDef10-GoingglobalEuropessecuritypolicychallenge.aspx

A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One )

14 Mar 2011 network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction

Abstract

This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose.

…………

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/708-davis.pdf

Counterfeit Drugs and National Security – Stimson Center

by BD Finlay – 2011
COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 1. The deadly implications of counterfeit drugs are well understood to be a central

The deadly implications of counterfeit drugs are well understood to be a central challenge to the integrity of public health systems around the globe, as well as a direct threat to our individual health and welfare. What is less understood is that the profits from this sinister crime are increasingly being co-opted by an array of organized criminal groups and terrorist entities as a means by which to fund their nefarious operations around the world. As such, counterfeit pharmaceuticals pose a direct threat to national and international security.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), counterfeit drugs could make up as much as half of the global pharmaceutical market, with the largest share of fake products circulating in the developing world where regulation and enforcement capacity is comparatively weak.1 Though…………….

www.stimson.org/…/Full_-_Counterfeit_Drugs_and_National_Security.pdf

Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa

GAO-11-449T

Summary

Somali pirates have attacked 640 ships and taken more than 3,150 hostages since 2007. A few U.S.-flagged vessels have been affected–most recently the SV Quest, a private yacht on which four Americans were killed in February 2011. The growing frequency and severity of attacks renew the urgency to address the piracy threat. As Somalia is unable to repress piracy, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy in collaboration with international and industry partners. In September 2010, GAO issued a report evaluating the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and the challenges they face, and (2) have collaborated with partners. This testimony is based on the September 2010 report and its objectives, and work GAO conducted in March 2011 to update report findings.

As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates’ rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden–the focus of the Action Plan–to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates’ success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan’s objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO’s September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies–such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort’s effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement.

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11449thigh.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d11449t.html

Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational …

Washington, D.C.. March 2011. By Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing. Secret Weapon: Highvalue Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation
Contents

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Interagency Coordination and Cross-functional Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Experimentation with Cross-functional Teams in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . 8

Top-down Emphasis on Interagency Teams in Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Bottom-up Experimentation with Interagency Teams in Iraq. . . . . . . . . . 18

Key Variables in Interagency High-value Target Team Performance. . . . 35

Interagency High-value Target Teams During and After the Surge. . . . . 49

Decline and Atrophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

www.ndu.edu/inss/…/Strategic%20Perspective%204%20Lamb-Munsing.pdf

African counter-terrorism legal frameworks a decade affer 2001

African counter-terrorism legal frameworks a decade after 2001 capacity public services, and where it is pursued at the expense of seeking other
Contents

About the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii

Acknowledgements and disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Abbreviations and acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2

The issues: Africa’s approach to counter-terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 3

The facts: legal and policy frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter 4

Opinions: explaining Africa’s ratification levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Chapter 5

Actions: improving ratification in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Chapter 6

Conclusion and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Ratification charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono177.pdf

Merchants of. African conflict. More than just a pound of flesh

Contents

List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

The privatisation of security in African confl icts

Sabelo Gumedze

Chapter 1

Will global demand for private military services in

major confl icts continue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Deane-Peter Baker

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Material factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Non-material factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Chapter 2

Human security and challenges related to private military and security

companies in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Irene Ndung’u

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Human security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

PMSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Locating the nexus: human security and PMSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

State sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Confl icts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

ii Institute for Security Studies

Contents

Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Core problems and stability in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Chapter 3

Regulatory approaches (if any) to private military and

security companies in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Regional mapping study

Sabelo Gumedze

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

UN General Assembly’s approach to mercenarism and PMSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

General trends and challenges regarding PMSCs in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Policy and regulatory initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

The South African approach to PMSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Chapter 4

The eff ect of private security on national armed forces’

capacity and capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Lindy Heinecken and Michon Motzouris

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

What led to the privatisation of security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Consequences for national armed forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Eff ect on future capacity and capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/more%20than%20just%20a%20pound%20of%20flesh.pdf

One thought on “Research and Papers

  1. I leave a comment whenever I especially enjoy a post on a site or if I have something to add to the discussion. It’s caused by the sincerness communicated in the post I looked at. And on this post Research and Papers WesternDefenseStudiesInstitute. I was excited enough to drop a thought 🙂 I do have some questions for you if it’s okay. Is it only me or do some of the comments look as if they are left by brain dead people? 😛 And, if you are writing on other online social sites, I’d like to keep up with you. Would you make a list every one of your public pages like your twitter feed, Facebook page or linkedin profile?

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s