Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa’ida’s Road in and Out of Iraq

Recent CTC Publications

Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa’ida’s Road in and Out of Iraq

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary

Key Findings

Policy Recommendations

2. Introduction

3. Figures: Maps, Tables, Charts

4. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout: Al‐Qa`ida’s Road In and Out of Iraq

Chapter 1. Foreign Fighters in Historical Perspective: The Case of Afghanistan

By Vahid Brown

Chapter 1 explains the role foreign fighters played during the anti‐Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s, providing context that is critical to understanding the role that foreign fighters currently play in Iraq. Brown’s discussion of Afghan Arabs alienating local Afghani mujahidin is particularly relevant considering the formation of anti‐al‐Qa`ida movements in Iraq. The chapter also helps us measure the prospect of foreign fighters in Iraq contributing to violent movements outside of Iraq, whether in the Arab world, Europe, or the United States.

Chapter 2. The Demographics of Recruitment, Finances, and Suicide

By Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman

In Chapter 2, Felter and Fishman expand on their preliminary analysis of the Sinjar Records released in December 2007. Incorporating even more data on foreign fighters in Iraq and using new analytical techniques, Felter and Fishman assess the factors that may have contributed to foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and explore the networks that funnel those fighters to Iraq. They provide the first hard evidence that foreign fighters of Saudi origin contribute more money to al‐Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) than individuals from other countries, explore the dynamics of AQI’s logistics networks in Syria, and offer an open‐source assessment of the percentage of suicide attacks in Iraq committed by foreign fighters.

Chapter 3. Bureaucratic Terrorists: Al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s Management and Finances

By Jacob Shapiro

In Chapter 3, Shapiro explores al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s finances and bureaucracy. Analyzing AQI’s spending patterns and accounting structures, Shapiro provides new insights into what the organization prioritizes and how it controls its agents. Among other insights, Shapiro reveals that AQI receives a large percentage of its funding from foreign fighters and likely has become more bureaucratic to rein in operators who use violence wantonly and thereby degrade fundraising opportunities. Shapiro also offers creative recommendations on how to use these insights to undermine AQI.

Chapter 4. Smuggling, Syria, and Spending

By Anonymous

Chapter 4 describes AQI’s smuggling efforts between Syria and Iraq’s Nineveh Province. Drawing on his extensive experience on the ground, the author describes smuggling networks and tribal relations, two elements critical for AQI’s human smuggling and the movement of goods and money. Importantly, Jihadis looking to leave Iraq may use these same networks to exit the country. The author also assesses AQI’s spending patterns in the border region.

Chapter 5. Beyond Iraq: The Future of AQI

By Peter Bergen

Chapter 5 looks to the future. Where will Jihadis in Iraq go if they leave? Using historical analogies and an assessment of current political dynamics around the Middle East, Bergen analyzes AQI’s interests and opportunities to bring Iraq‐style violence to other locations, in the Mideast and beyond. He concludes that the number of fighters leaving Iraq will be relatively small, but they will be highly‐skilled, and reminds us that a US withdrawal from Iraq will not necessarily end the flow of foreign fighters.

Addendum A: Author Biographies

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf

Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means”

Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means”

Download the Report

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to release Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means.” This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends. The report does not address Iran’s economic and social influence in Iraq.

* Chapter 1 describes Iran’s covert operations in Iraq before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, including the formation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

* Chapter 2 assesses the trajectory of Iranian intervention in Iraq since 2003.

* Chapters 3 and 4 describe Iranian lethal aid in Iraq and draw heavily on the interrogation summaries of detained militia members.

* Chapter 5 provides key findings and recommendations.

Like many CTC reports, Iranian Strategy in Iraq is partly based on declassified information. In this case, that data includes interrogation summaries of captured militia fighters, Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence reports, and data listing weapons caches found to contain Iranian-made weapons. All of this data has been declassified and approved for release. We hope that this report and the accompanying data will enable other researchers to further analyze the dynamics of Iranian influence in Iraq. We recognize the inherent problems in using some of the sources cited in this report. Indeed, we have serious concerns that Iraqi intelligence agents relied on information from the anti‐Iranian terrorist group, the Mujahidin‐e Khalq Organization (MKO). Data provided by the MKO is sometimes accurate but often considered not credible because of the MKO’s endemic interest in portraying Iran in as negative a light possible. Likewise, unclassified information from Coalition Forces’ SIGACTS reports can lack important context. Finally, information obtained from interrogations of detained militants must be interpreted with extreme caution. Detainees may be misinformed or lying, interrogators may misunderstand or poorly transcribe information, and the context of a detainee’s story may be missing. Readers should be wary of these problems, as we have tried to be.

Appendix A: Interrogation Summaries

Appendix B: Documents (mostly Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence documents)

Appendix C: Reports of Iranian weapons found in caches

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Iran_Iraq.asp

Interesting Readings

Richard Betts "Enemies of Intelligence"

http://www.hnet.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/EnemiesOfIntelligence-Roundtable.pdf

Phil Williams: "The Future of Global Systems"

http://www.scribd.com/doc/8329024/The-Future-of-Global-Systems-Collapse-or-Resilience

"Violent Non-state Actors and National and International Security".

http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=8EEBA9FE-478E-EA2C-AA15-32FC9A59434A&lng=en

Heavy Traffic on Beirut, Damascus, Tehran Diplomacy Highway

Heavy Traffic on Beirut, Damascus, Tehran Diplomacy Highway

Written by The Media Line Staff Published Monday, November 03, 2008

A series of meetings among high officials in Lebanon, Syria and Iran began on Sunday and continued on Monday.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki arrived today in Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad and Vice-President Farouq A-Shar’a.

During their meetings, the three are scheduled to discuss developments in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. They will also discuss the recent American attack in Syria, which was vehemently denounced by Iran.

Mottaki is also expected to meet with leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, whose offices are located in the Syrian capital. The meetings precede reconciliation talks scheduled for November 9 between the various Palestinian factions, including Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad.

Another series of meetings takes place today, as Hamas’ Political Bureau Chief Khalid Mash’al visits Lebanon, where he is scheduled to meet with Lebanon’s leadership, including President Michel Suleiman, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and Hizbullah leader Hasan Na’srallah.

Mash’al may also meet with leader of Lebanon’s anti-Syrian bloc, Sa’ad A-Din Al-Hariri.

Al-Hariri has more then once blamed the Syrian regime for its alleged involvement in the killing of his father, former Lebanese premier Rafiq Al-Hariri.

He recently held talks with Na’srallah in an attempt to solve the political standstill in Lebanon, ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections.

On Sunday former Lebanese president Emil Lahoud visited Tehran, where he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.

The three discussed recent regional developments and may also have spoken about last week’s comments by Hossein Hamedani, deputy commander of the Basij militia.

In a statement published on a website close to the country’s elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hamedani was quoted as saying, "Today, not only our armed forces are self sufficient but the freedom armies of the region get part of their weaponry from us."

Iran has in the past applied this description to Palestinian groups such as the Islamist Hamas and the fundamentalist Islamic Jihad, as well as the Lebanese-based Shi’ite terror organization Hizbullah.

All of these groups have vowed to fight Israel on behalf of Iran.

http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23186

NET EFFECT: HOW TECHNOLOGY SHAPES THE WORLD

November/December 2008

Net Effect: Development 2.0

By Blake Hounshell

They’ve been called the “development mafia”—shadowy experts in obscure disciplines such as drip irrigation and capacity building. But until recently, the tens of thousands of freelance consultants, NGO workers, and aid agency employees who make up the international development world were more of a scattered horde than a cohesive community. That might be about to change. Earlier this year, Raj Kumar, president and cofounder of the Washington-based Development Executive Group, launched a social networking tool designed to connect development professionals and the firms that require their expertise. The site, devex.com, was inspired by Web 2.0 companies such as Facebook and LinkedIn. But whereas Facebook junkies list their favorite bands and upload photographs of friends, Devex’s nearly 90,000 global users boast about their project management skills and their latest professional certifications. Site members can, depending on their level of access, post projects, form networks based on common interests, browse and monitor upcoming bids, find job opportunities, and get in touch with experts on the ground. Looking for an English-speaking agricultural specialist in Colombia with at least five years of experience? Devex gives you a choice of 28. At the heart of the site, though, is its massive projects database, which currently lists more than 47,000 projects on everything from rural sanitation in Bangladesh to policing in the Palestinian territories—searchable by region, country, donor, project type, or status. By aggregating this information in one place, Kumar says, Devex gives everyone a chance to find out about opportunities, not just the well-connected (though executive members do get “early intelligence” reports about upcoming projects). Kumar’s goal is to make a profit, but he also hopes the site will help more foreign aid reach those in need. “Efficiency isn’t sexy,” he admits. “But with $200 billion in foreign aid each year, a few percentage points of efficiency gains is like adding another Gates Foundation to the world.” ActionAid International, an antipoverty group, estimates that in 2004 alone, nearly $12 billion was spent on “over-priced and ineffective technical assistance.” For the world’s poorest, the social networking revolution couldn’t come soon enough. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4515

Mossad’s Secret Role delaying Rogue Nukes?

David Eshel

In 1950, 5-year-old Meir Huberman came to Israel as a holocaust survivor, now nearly sixty years later, renamed Dagan and toughened by almost a half-century defending the Jewish state, that son of Russian refugees heads one of the world’s most fearsome secret services: the Mossad. Evidence is mounting that Dagan has restored the Mossad’s reputation, after a long period of mismanagement and costly failures. According to unconfirmed sources, since Dagan was made spymaster in 2002 by his old army mentor, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, several Arab arch- terrorists have died mysteriously in foreign operations widely attributed to Mossad.

A retired general of compact build and few words, the pipe-smoking Dagan has stayed in the shadows, but he seems to lead his agency no doubt, with an iron grip.

In Fact under his leadership, Meir Dagan’s Mossad has undergone a revolution in terms of organization, intelligence and operations. Over the past two years, unofficial reports indicated, the Mossad having foiled three major Islamist attacks intended against Israeli targets in Africa, and another in Thailand.

Not everything went smooth, though. A few years ago, two Israelis were caught in Auckland trying to obtain a New Zealand passport by assuming the identity of a bedridden local man. They pleaded guilty and spent several months in jail. All-too reminiscent was Mossad’s botched 1997 attempt on the life of Hamas top man Khaled Meshaal in Amman, to which Ephraim Halevy owed his promotion having forced the resignation of then-Mossad director Major General Danny Yatom.

The Israeli media is normally extremely browbeat, if not even coy, in describing activities of Mossad’s secrets. Quite surprising then, was an interesting article published by the daily Haaretz newspaper on the Jewish New Year eve, which sheds some light on Meir Dagan’s clandestine activities. Here are some of the highlights of this quite rare revelation.

Olmert’s entry into power was Dagan’s big chance. Olmert did not have the military background of his predecessor, so that Dagan’s expertise could clearly come to the fore. Over the past two years Dagan has become the most important security official close to the prime minister. Olmert and his ministers are very much perturbed by developments in Iran and Meir Dagan’s presentations are highly commended by all concerned.

His evaluations on the Second Lebanon War and the Mossad’s cumulative achievements vis-a-vis Iran, Syria and Hezbollah have strengthened his status and led Olmert to approve more and more daring missions. But Dagan’s biggest step forward came as a result of his long Lebanon experience. The Winograd Committee that investigated the 2006 war cited his evaluations, which were far more accurate than the IDF’s.

During one of his last cabinet meeting, in which Olmert announced his resignation, he said: "I believe the processes the government of Israel has enacted under my leadership in various areas, those that can be told and those that cannot, will yet receive their proper place in the history of the State of Israel."

While Olmert did not go into detail, analysts mention that over the past year, since September 2007 when the nuclear facility built by Syria was bombed; Hezbollah still attributes to Israel the assassination of a senior leader, Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in February; the foreign press reported the blowing up of a chemical weapons factory in Syria, in which dozens of Iranian and Syrian technicians were killed; an Iranian Revolutionary Guards convoy delivering weapons to Hezbollah was blown up near Tehran. The Mysterious assassination of top Syrian adviser, Brigadier General Muhammad Suleiman in early August, directly connected to the nuclear issue. These events only added to the riddle, which surrounds Mossad’s alleged clandestine activities. In fact, no one has claimed responsibility for these actions, but the Arabs, at least, credit Dagan’s organization and whether right or wrong, it raises it’s prestige.

New year’s eve rumors in Tel Aviv mentioned news coming out of Damascus, that the nuclear reactor destroyed in Deir Al-Zour in the past year will be restored. Syria returned to the start of activity to build several new reactors. There were conflicting accounts in the Arab Media, about the identity of the senior officer who was killed in the bombing of the Al Qazzaz district in Damascus last week. Syrian sources said that among the dead was the Syrian army Brigadier General George Ibrahim al-Gharbi. Another report identified the slain officer as Brigadier General George Ibrahim Al-west, who was allegedly working in production management of the Syrian army. Finally, the dead man was believed to be Brigadier Abdul-Karim Abbas, Vice-Chairman of the Palestine Branch of Syrian intelligence. (Your choice- there is no official death certificate on any of these men!)

Quite surprisingly last June, prime Minister Olmert announced to the cabinet that Dagan’s tenure would be extended by another, seventh year, telling the ministers "there is no doubt that the work of the Mossad has taken off" thanks to Dagan.

Dagan’s main task is, however, to point his agency’s activities primarily to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Gaining insider access to vital intelligence from reliable sources is a major operation, which requires top expertise and experience second to none.

In the last year of Sharon’s term, the defense establishment presented a list of necessary equipment and organizational aspects to confront the Iranian threat. This included sophisticated deterrents and protection of sensitive facilities, with huge price tags. "Forget it," Dagan reportedly said. "Let me deal with Iran my way. I promise to give you deterrents in time."

Although there is only scant reliable information available to the professional media, Dagan’s Mossad seems to have gained some success in attempting to delay Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s nuclear project.

Over the past year a number of reports over malfunctions have emerged regarding the Iranian nuclear project. Among them: An Iranian general who defected, Ali-Reza Asgari, had been involved in leading his country’s contacts with Hezbollah; an Iranian dealer in sophisticated communications equipment was charged with spying for Israel and sentenced to death; his sons, engineers who helped build the Iranian centrifuges, were fielded as double agents for the CIA. It is still not clear who killed Ardeshire Hassanpour, 44, a leading Iranian nuclear physicist in February 2007, the local Fars news agency, reported that the man was "suffocated by fumes from a faulty gas fire in sleep." Only last February, a mysterious explosion rocked Tabriz, in which one of Iran’s top secret nuclear research facilities are located. Equally mysterious are reports, which indicate serious accidents in various production plants around the country, which remain unexplained.

Some of those who warn most vociferously against the Iranian threat are full of praise for Dagan. Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, who recommended Dagan’s appointment to Sharon, said he restored the Mossad to being "Israel’s long operational arm, with the ability to go anywhere and do anything it wanted." CIA chief Michael Hayden had warm words for the role played by an unnamed foreign intelligence agency that he said initially identified a structure at Al-Kibar as a nuclear reactor similar to one in North Korea. He likened the cooperation to "working together on a complex equation over a long period.

Dagan is now at the peak of his power. Premier-designate Tzipi Livni, a former junior officer in the Mossad, receives continual updates from him as foreign minister. But she has no experience of approving special operations. It will be interesting to see if she continues the line of approving Dagan’s daring operations, or will step back and sleep on things before making her decisions.

http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/100408_israelmossadsecretserviceroledelayingiraniansyriannuclearweapons.html

A Search for Israel’s Winning Strategy

David Eshel

Israel, October 10, 2008: For nearly six decades, Israel’s security doctrine was premised on three pillars: Deterrence, early warning, and quick victory. This was Israel’s traditional national security doctrine, which has undergone only a few changes, over the years, but added a fourth highly important, pillar- self defense, in face of the emergence of the growing missile and nuclear threat. Following the 2006 Second Lebanon War and the looming Iranian nuclear threat, self defense has become a dominant factor in Israel’s national security doctrine.

What Israel lacks these days, is a winning strategy. In a soul-searching article, veteran analyst and military expert, Ron Ben Yishai, elaborates his views in a series of articles published on the eve of Yom Kippur in Ynet. Here are some of the major highlights of his unique elaborations.

The “slow destruction” strategy was conceived by Iran and Syria, and other radical Islamic elements, to undermine Israel’s staying power and thus ultimately wipe it off the map. Hezbollah, which utilized this strategy to some degree of success during the Second Lebanon War, gave it its name: Muqauma (“Resistance” in Arabic.)

The ultimate aim of this strategy is to gradually minimize Israel’s territory, in a manner that would turn it’s Jewish population into a convenient and concentrated target for mortar shells, rockets, missiles, and terror attack, ( or ultimately, a "grand-slam" finale act of a nuclear attack), while making it difficult for the IDF to offer effective protective measures.

The hasty unilateral withdrawal from the South Lebanon Security Zone in May 2000 and Ariel Sharon’s dramatic and drastic evacuation Gaza Strip, gave the Muqauma a boost and motivation, because they were perceived as surrender to the pressures exerted by guerilla and terror. It also prepared the fiasco of the Second Lebanon War, from which Israel has yet to recover it’s political and military setback.

In its current format, the Muqauma identifies three Israeli vulnerabilities: The civilian home front, the Israeli public’s sensitivity to civilian and even more so, to IDF casualties and the sensitivity of it’s political leadership to international public opinion. Another factor, which the Jihadists, especially Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah have been using, to an unprecedented extent of cynical skullduggery, is to exert psychological pressure on bereaved and captive families, exploiting the Israeli media within their ruthless goal.

The Muqauma carefully takes into account the IDF’s relative advantage in accurate air power, the maneuvering and attack abilities of ground forces, and the ability to acquire accurate intelligence information. As a result, the radical Islamic axis has upgraded the Muqauma strategy and premised it on the means and principles that enable its users to powerfully hit Israel’s weak spots, while minimizing or annulling Israel’s military advantages. Their missiles and ground-to-ground rockets are fired by the dozens and hundreds out of well-hidden sites and civilian population centers, mostly with the aim of disrupting the daily and economic routine and put Israelis in an ongoing state of anxiety. Russian-made anti-aircraft weapons systems that to some extent are said to be immune to disruption, are believed to become part of Hezbollah’s newly refurbished arsenal. According to intelligence reports from Lebanon, it appears that apart from it’s controversial fiber-optic communication network, Hezbollah, with Iranian expert assistance, are secretly preparing fortified anti-aircraft positions on Lebanon’s mountain peaks. Even Hamas in Gaza is attempting to equip itself with shoulder-held rockets and anti-aircraft machine guns.

What seems amazing is that after so many years of contending with the Muqauma, the IDF, other security branches, and Israel’s political leadership have been unable to formulate a sound counter-strategy and an appropriate arsenal of means that would enable the Jewish State to win. In fact, government and its diplomatic and security conduct are still zigzagging among three different strategic doctrines.

http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/1010081israelssearchwinningstrategy.html#more